FACT in the United States, among economists, investment advisers, housewives, and everyone else, is that the rate of inflation has been significantly higher during the past two years than at any time since the Korean war. It has increased despite the best efforts of Washington policy makers to restrain it through, first, the tax surcharge of July 1968; second, a reduction in the growth of the money supply virtually to zero beginning in June 1969; and third, a strenuous effort by the administration to reduce federal expenditures even to the point of the veto of a large education bill.'
the behavior of other indexes. Four-quarter rates of change of the CPI are shown in column 1 of Table 1 , and the rates in 1968 and 1969 are clearly the highest for any postwar year since 1951. For the nonfarm private deflator (NPD), which covers the output of the economy other than the government and farm sectors, the 1969 rate of increase is the highest since 1951, but the rate in 1968 was lower than that in 1956 and was only moderately above that for 1966. The excess of the CPI rate over the NPD rate was unusually high in 1968 and 1969, reflecting the coverage of some items, including home mortgage costs and farm prices (column 3), by one series but not the other. Finally, while the rate of increase of these three The acceleration in prices of 1969 was particularly notable against the background of a decelerating growth of real output. Starting with the fourth quarter of 1968, real GNP grew consistently less rapidly than its potential. From the fourth quarter of 1968 to the fourth quarter of 1969, the advance in real GNP was only 11/2 percent. The professional forecasts prevailing at the beginning of 1969 generally foresaw this slowdown in the pace of real output, but they predicted an accompanying deceleration in prices that was not realized.
Was there something new and different about the price performance of 1969? Or can it be explained on the basis of experience prior to that period? What does it tell about the prospects for combining high employment and price stability in the years ahead? In particular, does the recent experience on prices and unemployment square with the avowed goal of public policy to achieve an unemployment rate of 4 percent, or more prec.sely 3.8 percent, accompanied by relative price stability? And does it augur well for the policy scenario of the Council of Economic Advisers, in which inflation is reduced to a moderate rate by a small temporary increase in the unemployment rate above 4 percent between early 1970 and mid-1971, followed by a return in 1972 to a 3.8 percent unemployment rate?2
Explainiing the Facts
The primary aim of this paper is to present answers to these questions, explaining recent price performance and presenting a detailed projection of the quarterly rate of inflation that would accompany the council's projection of the course of output and employment during 1970-75. The paper is thus an application to issues of current interest of my larger effort the council projects a small gap between actual output and the potential output the economy could produce at a 3.8 percent unemployment rate, and its elimination after mid-1972. According to equation (2) in App. B to this paper, this gap is closely related to the unemployment rate, and so the council's gap diagram can be directly translated into statements about the unemployment rate.
to develop price forecasting equations by translating into formal econometric terms alternative theories of the determinants of price and wage movements. One major purpose of my research is to test the accelerationist hypothesis, associated in the professional economics literature with the names of Milton Friedman and Edmund Phelps. According to the accelerationist view, the cost of maintaining low unemployment rates-lower than some unspecified "natural" rate-is not a mild and steady rate of price increase, but rather an accelerating and increasingly severe inflation. As Henry Wallich has put it:
There has been a school of thought that has advocated the use of inflation as a means of raising employment. There was a trade-off, so we were told, between inflation and unemployment.... Recent experience has made clear that this is a fallacy. The theory rests on the assumption that inflation does not tend to accelerate. At the very low rates of unemployment that we have been fortunate to have, inflation unfortunately has not remained constant. It has speeded up, because people have observed what went on and protected themselves-by raising wages, interest rates, and prices.... Over a few months, no doubt, the trade-off between inflation and unemployment can always be practiced. In the longer run, it cannot.3 A natural conclusion suggested by the accelerationist view (although subscribers to it are usually reluctant to attach specific numbers to their analysis) is that the average unemployment rate of 3.7 percent during 1966-69 was too low and caused an accelerating inflation in the last few years, and that therefore the rate must be significantly raised if an accelerating inflation is to be avoided.
As I have explained in the paper cited above, my equations do not validate the accelerationist hypothesis, although they originate in and follow its framework. Rather, they confirm the Phillips curve argument that a reduction in the unemployment rate can be traded off against a higher but ultimately stable rate of inflation. If high value is placed on a low unemployment rate like the 1966-69 average, the associated inflation will at least be steady rather than accelerating, even though it may be substantial. The equations that refute the accelerationist hypothesis are able accurately to reproduce the quarterly pattern of inflation in the nonfarm private deflator for 1964-69 given information only on unemployment, changes in output, productivity, and social security tax rates, and increases in prices and Since these equations have been reasonably successful in tracking past performance, they can be used to explain the acceleration of prices since 1968, and also to appraise the likely combinations of rates of inflation and of unemployment in the period 1970-75.
The Explanation of Changes in Prices and Wages

THE PRICE EQUATION
Like most research in this area, my econometric efforts divide the analysis of inflation into two parts: the determination of prices given wage costs and the determination of wages given prices. The price equation includes four variables that were found to be highly significant when fitted to quarterly data from 1951 through 1969: standard unit labor costs, actual unit labor costs, the ratio of factory orders to shipments, and an adjusted employment rate.
Standard unit labor cost. The relation of prices to unit labor costs (that is, the wage rate divided by labor productivity) seems roughly consistent with the hypothesis that prices are set to yield a target rate of return at some standard level of capacity utilization, or that they are set to exceed labor cost by some constant markup fraction at that standard utilization level. The role played by the standard utilization level reflects the judgment, supported by numerous studies reporting on interviews with businessmen, that firms will not in general raise prices in response to an increase in labor costs caused by low productivity arising from an economic slowdown, as they would in response to an increase in wage rates at some given level of productivity. Thus in either the target-rate-of-return or markup theory of pricing, the pivotal variable is what I shall call standard unit labor cost, defined as the wage rate (w) divided by an estimate of what productivity would be if the economy were operating continually at full capacity, or standard productivity (q').
Actual unit labor cost. My estimate of standard productivity simply assumes that it increases at a steady rate between its cyclical peaks, reached in 1947, 1950, 1955, and 1966. During the long interval of slow growth between 1955 and 1966, actual productivity dipped substantially below the standard productivity trend line. Firms may have made the erroneous assumption that long-run productivity growth had slowed down perma-nently, and thus they may have estimated standard productivity at a level below q'. To allow for this possibility, I include actual unit labor cost (w/q) in addition to standard unit labor cost in the price equation and let the data determine the relative weights on each in the pricing process.
Ratio of new or-ders to shipments. The markup fraction should not be expected to remain constant but instead to depend on excess demand in the market for goods. During rapid expansion in output, with new orders flowing in faster than firms can convert them into shipments, the markup fraction may be raised in the belief that price resistance is weak. When shipments catch up with orders, however, the markup margin may return to its previous level. An excess demand variable is suggested not only in moderm markup pricing theories, but also in the more traditional classic theories of perfect competition. There are many possible candidates for an excess demand variable; my choice is the ratio of new orders to shipments (O/S).
The employment rate. In a classical view of the labor market, firms equate the marginal product of labor to the real wage of workers. And the marginal product declines at high rates of employment as more workers are added to a relatively fixed stock of capital. Thus an increase in employment can be achieved only if the real wage is reduced, which, for a given nominal wage rate, requires a price increase. In short, the ratio of prices to wages at standard capacity becomes an increasing function of the employment rate, and the employment rate therefore becomes a variable in the price equation. The adjusted employment rate used in this paper is described below.
Because changes in price, output, or inputs impose substantial transaction costs, a change in a variable determining the price level should not be expected to exert its influence immediately. Thus the current price level may depend not only on the currenlt value of variables like unit labor cost, but also on their past values. After extensive experimentation, I found that the explanatory power of the 
THE DETERMINATION OF WAGE RATES
The wage equation involves four explanatory variables-the adjusted employment rate, the expected rate of change of consumer prices, the rate of change of output, and the rate of change of the social security tax rate. The dependent variable in the wage equation is the rate of change of the wage rate divided by standard productivity or standard unit labor costs. This formulation reflects the view that the response of workers to a given combination of a wage offer and expected price level will depend on their estimate of a normal real wage. What they consider normal will presumably increase over time as the average productivity of labor increases.
The employment rate. The employment rate is the standard measure of pressure on the labor market. In principle, strength of the labor market is evidenced by any increase in manhours whether in the form of a reduction in unemployment, a movement of individuals into the labor force, or an increase in hours. Hence, the employment rate in this wage equation must take account of all three sources of increases in labor input, and not simply a reduction in unemployment, which is represented in the officially published unemployment rate. For this reason I have constructed a new data series, "the total employment rate of manhours," to be used in these wage and price equations. The r-ate of change of output. Unfortunately, the wage index for the nonf arm private economy is not based on wage rates, but on total compensation divided by total manhours. This series tends to be sensitive to the mixture of employment among high-wage and low-wage industries. When an economic expansion begins and employment in the high-paying durable goods industries increases, compensation per manhour will rise even if underlying wage rates are constant. Experimentation suggests that the rate of change of output is an excellent proxy for this change in the employment mix, and this variable is thus included in the final wage equation.
The social security tax rate. The employers' share of increases in the social security tax rate is included in compensation per manhour. Therefore the change in the effective social security tax rate has been included in the wage equation.
Guideposts. Just as the 1962-66 guideposts were expected to reduce the response of prices to changes in labor costs, so they were expected to reduce wage demands for a given state of the labor market. Some previous studies have indicated that the guideposts significantly reduced wage increases in the early 1960s; this is not confirmed in my research and so no guidepost dummy has been included in the wage equation All variables are expressed as changes over four-quarter intervals. The terms in parentheses below the estimated coefficients are t statistics. According to this equation, the major determinants of wage changes are the level of the adjusted employment rate, the expected rate of change of consumer prices, and the rate of change of output. Although the change in the social security tax rate is not significant by standard statistical tests, its coefficient is of some importance, and it is retained because it is significant in many other versions of the wage equation that have been estimated.
In testing the accelerationist model, the coefficient of the expected price variable is critical. If that coefficient were approximately 1, the equation would foretell an endless wage-price spiral whenever the employment rate exceeded some critical level. But since it is 0.45, very substantially less than 1, each successive round of the wage-price spiral at a given employment rate will be smaller than the last, until both wages and prices stabilize at a steady rate of growth. The simulation results below compute the long-run steady rates of inflation predicted for different employment rates when the wage-price equations are combined. The positive coefficient on the rate of change of output in the wage equation implies that a slow economic expansion will generate less inflation than a fast one at any given employment rate. A slow advance to an employment rate like 96 percent subsequently held constant will not, however, yield a permanent benefit compared with a faster advance to the same rate. Ultimately the rate of inflation will be the same no matter how a given employment rate is approached.
Price Simulations TRACKING INSIDE THE SAMPLE PERIOD
How effectively can the final wage and price equations track the actual course of the price level (nonfarm private deflator) during the inflation of the mid-1960s? In a simulation experiment the history of wages and prices through the end of 1963 is fed into the computer, and then the wage and price equations are set loose to estimate the course of inflation over the sixyear period 1964-69 given actual values of the employment rate, output, the social security tax rate, and productivity in that period. Pending further study of the factors that have caused the consumer price index to rise more rapidly than the nonfarm private deflator since mid-1967, the simulation takes as given the difjerence between the two price indexes. Thus if the simulation underpredicts the nonfarm private deflator, it will also underpredict the consumer price index that enters (with a lag) into the wage equation.
Why run a simulation for a period that is part of the sample period of the fitted equations? A simulation inside the equations' sample period is a less challenging test than, say, a simulation for 1964-69 using coefficients fitted for a sample period ending in 1963. The 1964-69 period is included in the sample because the fitted equations are to be used as forecasting devices and are likely to be more accurate when the latest possible information is included. The simulation experiments are designed to test the tracking ability of the forecasting equations during the few years closest to the period of forecast. Errors in the simulations using these equations may indicate whether some aspects of the forecasts are less reliable than others.5
Although it is not iliustrated here, a simulation experiment for 1964-69 has been performed with equations identical to equations (1) quarters earlier than it actually did, the inflation rate in late 1967 and early 1968 is underestimated, and the rate in mid-1969 is overestimated.6 These errors partially cancel out over the whole period, so that the simulated price level is close to the actual value by the end of 1969 (the values are 1.265 and 1.256, respectively). 6 . In comparing the simulations of these wage and price equations with simulation tests of equations developed by other authors, the reader should note that these simulations are a more challenging test than the forecasting record achieved by a price equation that takes the wage rate as given, but less challenging than simulations performed for large-scale econometric models where variables like the unemployment rate and productivity are explained rather than taken as given, as is the case here.
CAUSES OF INFLATION,
THROUGH MID-1968
Which explanatory variables are most important in causing the changes of the simulated rate of inflation as illustrated in Figure 1 ? The most important variable in the model is the total unemployment rate of manhours (described above and shown in column 4 of Table 2), which deter- Given these assumptions regarding explanatoly variables, forecasts are Table 3 Regimes C and D assume that the output gap created during 1970 is retained rather than eliminated. If policy makers decide that the resumption of inflation predicted for 1973-75 under regimes A and B is unacceptable, they may reluctantly conclude that a higher unemployment rate must be maintained in order to lower the long-term steady rate of inflation. Under regime C the official unemployment rate is maintained at about 4.8 percent, a level similar to that of early 1965. The result is a steady inflation rate of slightly less than 2.5 percent. If such a rate is viewed as excessive, regime D might be chosen. Under this final alternative the longterm unemployment rate is 6 percent and the steady rate of inflation levels off at about 1.1 percent. This is roughly similar to the rate of price increase in 1963, when the official unemployment rate was close to 6 percent. The combinations of inflation forecasts and official unemployment rates in the forecasts can be plotted in the form of a Phillips curve. The result is a straight line predicting a zero rate of inflation at an official unemployment rate of 6.8 percent, slightly less than the peak of unemployment rates of the 1958 and 1961 recessions.
Conclusion
This paper has presented simulations and forecasts of the rate of inflation based on price and wage equations estimated for the 1951-69 period. They are based on only one of many possible sets of wage and price equations estimated for only one of many alternative sample periods and by only one of many different and equally acceptable statistical techniques. The reader is warned that the exact magnitude of the permanent rates of inflation at alternative steady rates of unemployment is sensitive to minor changes in the estimated equations and in the methods used to forecast explanatory variables. But changes in econometric details do not alter the following principal conclusions: * At a steady rate of unemployment, the rate of inflation will be stable after a transition period and will not tend to accelerate or decelerate. * The model presented in this paper is capable of explaining with reasonable accuracy the path of inflation in 1964-69 without recourse to the accelerationist hypothesis. * The "stop-go" policy of the Council of Economic Advisers, aimed at reducing or eliminating inflation by creating a temporary real output gap followed by rapid output growth to close the gap, will yield a temporary reduction in the rate of inflation as long as the gap is maintained, but the rate of inflation will rise again when the output gap is eliminated. In the wage equations for this paper the expected price change variable is a weighted average of past price changes, with the weights adding to unity and distributed over past periods as indicated by the coefficients on g, listed above.
Generation of Explanatory Variables THE CONSUMER PRICE INDEX
In period t we generate the nonfarm private deflator, and this must somehow be translated into the consumer price index in period t, which is needed to form the expected price variable gc*,,,. Exploratory regressions 2. The definitions for symbols in this and the equations that follow are given in App. C. revealed that the rate of change of the consumer price index is determined partly by the nonfarm private deflator (as is to be expected since the two indexes share many common elements-although one is a Paasche and one a Laspeyres index), partly by the rate of change of farm prices, and marginally by the rate of change of the mortgage interest rate. Excluding the latter determinant, which has a very small effect on the results, the best regression explaining the consumer price index is of the form g,, = 0.0001 + 0.78 gp, + 0.32 gft, with the coefficients estimated in one-quarter rates of change. The puzzling aspect of this regression is the high weight on farm prices, a result caused presumably by a positive correlation between changes in farm prices and changes in excluded variables during the sample period. Since we have no method of forecasting farm prices, we assume that on average the rates of change of gf and g, will be identical, so that in our forecasts we generate one-quarter changes in consumer prices by the formula get = 0.0001 + 1.10 gp.
THE OFFICIAL UNEMPLOYMENT RATE
The rate of change of output in the private economy (gQt) is taken as the single exogenous variable in the forecasts, the level of output is calculated, and on the assumptions that aggregate GNP grows as fast as private nonfarm GNP and that potential aggregate GNP grows at an assumed 4 percent per annum, the gap (Ht) between potential and predicted actual output can be obtained. Then the official concept of the unemployment rate is explained by the following nonlinear version of Okun's law, which was estimated for 1951-69 and fits very well during the sample period: I also have a couple of more fundamental questions about the adjustments that are made in going to the manhour unemployment rate concept.
First, I have never been persuaded that you ought to count as unemployed those people who are not actively seeking work, but who we're told by some participation rate equation would enter the labor force if the employment rate reached a certain level. What participation rate equations say is that if you expand employment by a certain amount more people will start looking for work. This says something about how fast labor markets will tighten as you expand output. It is not the same as saying that these marginal workers should be given equal weight with someone actually unemployed when you are trying to measure how tight or loose the labor market is at a particular time or output level.
Second, I am not convinced that bodies and average hours deserve equal weight in an unemployment measure. Gordon's equations describe as equally tight a labor market with a 31/2 percent unemployment rate and a 40.0 hour workweek, and one with a 5 percent unemployment rate and a 40.6 hour workweek. My intuition strongly tells me that a 31/2 percent unemployment rate and a 40-hour week mean a much tighter labor market. If so, hours and bodies should not be combined into an overall index.
Finally, in regard to Solow's point about lags apparently being short, one place where the lags seem to be present is in productivity. What happened in 1956 and what happened in 1969 is hard to explain, but we shouldn't pretend that it isn't part of the world. You do slow down output for a long time before you unwind something like the present inflation, even though it doesn't show up in an equation that takes unemployment and productivity as given. R. J. Gordon: Let me first explain how manhours enter in and why they contribute to the sharp drop in the manhour unemployment rate in 1969. The trend of potential manhours is estimated by connecting actual manhours at peaks of economic activity. For the last few years, I connected a peak in early 1965 with the peak quarter of 1969. In this interval, the trend line drops much faster than it did over the previous decade. I cannot say how much of the shortfall from the previous trend line is cyclical, due to part-time workers, and how much is secular, due perhaps to a decline in hours in the service industries.
The important point is that, although actual hours per worker did not rise in 1969, they did not continue to fali in step with the new trend line. Thus measured against the sharp drop in the trend line, manhours rose, helping the manhours unemployment rate to drop sharply. If the trend line were changed, the inflation of 1969 would not be overpredicted as it now is in my analysis.
On the question of productivity, the model identifies two kinds of effects. First, by including a distributed lag on past changes in output in the manhours equations, it captures the expected cyclical behavior of productivity. But there is an additional diminishing returns effect, implying that during periods of steady growth in output, the level of productivity will be positively related to the unemployment rate. Gordon insisted that he had given the accelerationist hypothesis a genuine chance in his research: He had tested a variety of possible time pattems for expected prices, and all patterns showed that the impact of prices on wages was substantially less than proportional, contrary to the accelerationist view. He had even assumed proportionality, forcing the expected price variable to take on a coefficient of 1 in the wage equation; but then he obtained very poor explanations and predictions of actual movements.
General Discussion
Robert Hall, however, argued that the findings had to be qualified: "The accelerationist theory has never really been tested in the postwar American experience. We have not had a sufficiently sustained inflationary experience to generate acceleration. Yet the Gordon paper essentially runs through a high employment projection that would produce a sustained inflationary experience of chronic 33/4 percent inflation accompanying 3.8 percent unemployment. Gordon has shown that there is a perfectly consistent view of what has happened in the last twenty years that does not rest on the one-for-one transmission of prices into wage increases. That doesn't really say that the accelerationist thesis is definitely wrong."
Hall offered as an example the possibility that people form their expectations of inflation by extrapolating the actual minimum rate of inflation in the previous five years. Under those circumstances, one would not be able to confirm the accelerationist thesis at any time in the postwar period even if it were entirely correct.
William Fellner made a related point about interpreting evidence. A tightening of stabilization policy has sometimes, as in 1952-53 and 1960, had a noticeable effect in slowing prices before it substantially raised unemployment, as these magnitudes are measured by Gordon. Such episodes would generate misleading evidence against the accelerationist thesis.
In response, Gordon pointed out that since we have now had four consecutive years of high employment and inflation, any process of accelerating expectations should be reflected in his model results, and none is visible.
Solow speculated: "If we were actually to live in an economy in which the price level rose by 4 percent a year-year in and year out-the accelerationist hypothesis would probably show up more strongly in the data than it does now." But Solow found it hard to believe that the performance of an economy with a steady 4 percent rate of inflation would be substantially different from the performance of one with a random mixture of 2 percent rates half the time and 6 percent rates the other half.
David Fand probed the influence of social security taxes on inflation in Gordon's findings. If this result is accepted, he suggested that a reconsideration of payroll taxes would be desirable for public policy.
Only a few participants expressed reservations about Gordon's findings that high employment and price stability are incompatible goals. William Branson noted that Gordon's own statistical findings pointed to a considerable range of uncertainty. The best-estimate numbers are not reliable enough statistically to rule out the possibility that high employment and price stability may be compatible. 
